27 september 2019

IN 2012 the Dutch politician-philosopher Thierry Baudet published “The Significance of Borders”. In that book he intended, as the sub-title of the book mentions, to demonstrate “why Representative Government and the Rule of Law Require Nation States”. While I believe that that proposition itself might be correct, the argumentation or “proof” provided by TB is not convincing, even wrong.

But first this. In his preface TB explains that the current mainstream idea that the challenges posed by globalisation require a supra-national response and therefore the abolition or dampening of nation-states, is wrong. Yes, global challenges exist and they require global responses, but these responses will have to be pre-discussed, agreed upon, defended and executed at the level of the nation-state. He calls this “international cooperation on the basis of accountable nation states” sovereign cosmopolitanism. I agree with this sovereign cosmopolitanism and it explains why safeguarding and strenghtening nation-states is essential in order to manage globalization.

Back to our main topic. For Baudet, the Representative Government and the Rule of Law have in common that “the people” have to be represented in respectively a parliament and a Supreme Court. This requirement pre-supposes the existence of a “we”, a coherent mass, a nation. He quotes Paul Scheffer who wrote in 2007 : “Without a ‘we’, it won’t work.”

This reasoning does not convince me at all. The classic liberal democracy is precisely an institutional structure which enables conflicting views and interests to interact and clash. The strength of the liberal democratic model is that it allows diversity to live together. Was there a “we” in the past ? There were Catholics, Protestants, Liberals, Social-Democrats and Communists. In that sense there has never been a “we”. And at least in theory we can simply enrich this system without changing it fundamentally : we can add new branches or pillars next to the existing ones : a green branch, a Muslim branch and a nationalist party. Also the Supreme Courts never represented a “we”. In many cases the decisions by Supreme Courts are transparent about who voted in favour of and who voted against fundamental discussions in society.

Having said this, I do not exclude that our societies need to maintain a minimum of cohesion but I am (certainly at this moment) hesitant to state how much cohesion our societies require. Based on my own book I believe that a minimum level of cohesion requires at least a common language, at least to be able to have a discussion on important items.

In this context I also present the following quote by Paul Morland at the end of a book review (FT of 24AUG2019 – The new demography) :

“For liberals who are relaxed about immigration and ethnic change, it is now incumbent upon them to come up with ways in which a coherent society can be formed from people of different backgrounds. Just as a nationalist sentiment was required to form the warfare states of Europe over the past two hundred years, so something new will be needed in its place if the welfare states of today are to survive in anything like their current form.”

Evidently, Paul Morland is mistaken. “Relaxed” liberals will not take any initiative because they do not see any problem at all and believe in the self-organising forces in society. The initiative to ensure a minimum level of coherence of society will have to be taken by less “relaxed” people.

24 september 2019

Artikel 1 van de Nederlandse Grondwet met als titel “gelijke behandeling en discriminatieverbod” luidt als volgt : “Allen die zich in Nederland bevinden, worden in gelijke gevallen gelijk behandeld. Discriminatie wegens godsdienst, levensovertuiging, politieke gezindheid, ras, ģeslacht of op welke grond dan ook, is niet toegestaan.”

Niets abnormaals, denkt u, en gelijk hebt u. Maar hebt u de formulering opgemerkt “in gelijke gevallen”?  Deze formulering is uiteraard terecht; Het lijkt ethisch terecht om enkel dat gelijk te behandelen wat gelijk is. Het zou verder ethisch incorrect zijn om het ongelijke toch gelijk te behandelen.

De formulering “in gelijke gevallen” maakt veel mogelijk.

24 september 2019

Page XVI-XVII

“One factor in particular is the peculiar nature of the contemporary international system, one that despite good intentions arguably promotes political decay.

If one examines historical cases of state formation and state building in the regions of the world that have strong states (primarily Europe and East Asia), the uncomfortable truth emerges that violence has always been a key ingredient…

Today’s international system does not look kindly on interstate violence and the kind of wars of conquest and consolidation that as recently as the 1870s produced the present-day countries of Italy and Germany. Africa, for example, was saddled with an irrational political map upon decolonization, one that corresponded to neither geography, ethnicity, nor economic functionality…

Today, we have a situation in which things that weaken states and promote political decay – like weapons, drugs, laundered money, security advisors, refugees, and diamonds – can cross international borders with relative ease, while the world’s normative structure and the institutions built around it … inhibit the kind of muscular state-building that was necessary to political development in other parts of the world.”

23 september 2019

In 2002 publiceerde Pim Fortuyn zijn boek “De verweesde samenleving”. Daarin schreef hij een aantal nu toch profetisch klinkende statements. Onder andere de volgende :

” Meer dan ooit dienen samenlevingsverbanden te worden gekoesterd en onderhouden… (blz. 202)

De onderklasse heeft in politiek opzicht nauwelijks een stem van betekenis meer…(blz. 203)

De bovenklasse wordt in rap tempo Europeaan en in mindere mate wereldburger…  Zij laat de onderklasse en grote delen van de middenklasse… verweesd en zonder leiding achter. Zij vindt het zelfs niet nodig om voor hen een perspectief te schilderen, een beleid te ontwikkelen waarin de regio’s, de natiestaat en de grotere verbanden op Europees en wereldniveau een plek krijgen, waardoor de wereld ook voor hen die die grote sprongen niet zullen maken, herbergzaam blijft… Als de elite blijvend weigert zich dit aan te trekken en dit probleem serieus te nemen, dan zullen de achterblijvers hun eigen wereld scheppen. Een eng nationalistische wereld, waarin het eigen volk eerst komt. Dat valt hun niet te verwijten, maar de elite die hen aan hun lot heeft overgelaten. (blz. 203-204)”

Recent, anno 2019, schreef Marc Reugebrink in een opiniestuk onder de titel “Heimat is niet per se rechts” (DS 19SEPT 2019) :

“In heel Europa zien we ‘een ruk naar rechts’, zelfs naar extreemrechts. Maar dat is vooral het gevolg van het feit dat alleen die rechtse partijen een ‘thuis’ in de aanbieding lijken te hebben, hoe bedompt en bedenkelijk ook. Alleen zij lijken ons schadeloos te stellen voor wat de alomtegenwoordige macht van de markt, de globalisering en de totale verwaarlozing van de culturele diversiteit bij veel mensen hebben aangericht : de vernietiging van hun waardigheid en wereldvertrouwen. ‘There’s no such thing as society’, decreteerde bullebak Margaret Thatcher – en het blijkt dat we niet zonder kunnen.”

Op dit vlak hebben de traditionele partijen (zeker in Vlaanderen) tussen 2002 en 2019 gefaald. Het is nog niet te laat maar verontrustend is wel dat het er sterk op lijkt dat de traditionele partijen qua standpunten vandaag de dag niet geëvolueerd zijn in vergelijking met 2002.  Een verdere verrechtsing is dan ook niet alleen mogelijk maar zelfs waarschijnlijk.

19 september 2019

After Ursula von der Leyen presented her new Commission, the function of commissionary Schinas caused some uproar because of his task description “to defend the European way of life” and because this task was linked to the management of the migration flows, suggesting that migrants were a threat to the so-called “European way of life”.

Therefore von der Leyen thought it was useful to remind the European public of the European Values and she had a statement on this published in a set of important European newspapers on 16 September 2019. In that statement she referred to Article 2 of the European Union Treaty. Since we agree that this basic reference to formally validated European Values is a useful clarification we publish it also on this website.

How the linkage between “European Way of Life”, “European Values” and migration has to be understood will be debated in detail in the European Parliament in the coming weeks.

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

19 september 2019

In religious debates, there always exist people on the one hand who want to stay close to the source texts, be it the Quran, the Thora or the Bible, and others, who believe these sacred texts require a “smart” reading. According to these people the sacred texts were written in a very specific context and when using them today as guidance for the Faith, readers should only focus on the part which is relevant for the core of the religion.

Although I have a great deal of sympathy for what I will call “the interpreters” or “modernists”, the truth is that I see an important epistemological problem for them. Do these modernists have a procedure available to distill the everlasting truth from a religious text or do they take what they like and throw away what they do not like ? Do they have an algorithm or a direct connection with God that gives them the appropriate inspiration to make the distinction between the Truth and a simple human-made story ?

17 september 2019

In English the word “respect” can be used in two different meanings. It can be used to refer to “accept/tolerate” ( as in “I respect their choice” ) but it can also be used to refer to a more positive feeling of admiration (as in “I have a great respect for their decision” ). The word is the same, the meaning is different.

This introduction allows me to express my opinion about the headscarf. I respect the choice of women who want to wear it  but I have no respect at all for their decision. 

With great regularity states in Western Europe are confronted with legal cases against prohibitions to wear the headscarf. Unfortunately these discussions remain at a “formal” level. The discussion is then whether women are free to choose to wear the hijab or not. Personally I’m in favour of the French concept that the state should be neutral and that therefore a headscarf is not acceptable for people working for the government. Next to that I believe that the principle of freedom of religion should reign and that therefore women should be free to decide whether they want to wear the headscarf or not.  I respect their choice. 

But the question of freedom of choice only skims the surface. It does not ask to the muslima why she wants to wear the hijab or believes she has to wear the veil. I assume here that she wants to wear the headscarf for religious reasons. If not. the Muslima would not be able to defend wearing it based on the principle of freedom of religion. 

But then, why does her religion impose the wearing of the hijab? 

In general, reference is made to two different soera’s in the Quran. 

First, there is soera 24 (“Light”), verse 31 :

“And tell believing women that they should lower their eyes, guard their private parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] to reveal; they should draw their coverings over their necklines and not reveal their charms except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their womenfolk, their slaves, such men as attend them who have no desire, or children who are not yet aware of women’s nakedness; they should not stamp their feet so as to draw attention to any hidden charms.”

Next, there is soera 33 (“The Joint  Forces”), verse 59 :

“Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make their outer garments hang low over them so as to be recognized and not insulted…” 

In his famous novel “Snow”(chapter 2), Orhan Pamuk depicts how a Muslim kills the Director of an institute because he prohibited the wearing of the veil. This extremist refers to the two soera’s mentioned above and states that “a woman who has covered herself is making a statement. Through her choice of clothing, she is saying,           ” Don’t harass me. “” and he adds “The veil saves women from the animal instincts of men in the street.” 

In their book “Finalement, il y a quoi dans le Coran?”, Rachid Benzine et Ishmael Saidi also focus on those two soera’s. Overall they mention that the wearing of the hijab was not introduced by the Quran but was already in use before the arrival of the prophet and was the habit of non slave women. As such it was an indication of a social status. The use of the hijab was only confirmed by Islam. 

It’s time to draw some conclusions :

Assuming that the hijab is a religious phenomenon (and not a merely cultural one), we take note that :

> it serves to differentiate and therefore polarize between good women and bad women; between women that should not be harassed and women who are allowed to be harassed. Sometimes it is stated that it is more important what is in the head than what is on the head. According to a more conservative interpretation of Islam, this statement is highly questionable.

> it assumes and insinuates that men cannot control their instincts when confronted with a non veiled woman. Such an assumption should evidently be considered an insult by any modern man. 

At a more fundamental level two additional concerns should be raised :

> The veil is sexist and there is no valid argument why only women should wear it. Tariq Ramadan himself claimed to be irresistible to (some) women but did not consider to wear it.

> Further, it requires a twisted mindset to want to hide beauty. From a hedonistic perspective it would be reasonable to hide (male or female) ugliness.

Evidently, The veil is therefore not in its place in the 21st century and while I respect the choice of women to wear it I have no respect at all for their choice. 

17 september 2019

Francis Fukuyama, well known as the author of “The End of History and the Last Man”, devotes his attention to “Identity” because he notes that identity, as a consequence of the ongoing globalisation, becomes more and more confused while a clear identity is needed to underpin a nation, which is itself required to ensure the functioning of democratic institutions.

It is possible to read this book in a very efficient way and to go directly to chapter 14 (the last one) with the title”What is to be done ?” If you do this you will miss how the meaning of identity changed over time, from Catholicism to Luther, to Kant, to Rousseau, and so on, but you will have more time to consider the relevant statements FF makes about the problem of identity in our times, both in the USA and in Europe. Essential is, according to FF that at the basis of identity resides “dignity”; The search for identity is a search for Dignity (thymos). Hereafter I only focus on chapter 14.

FF sees currently three main ways identity is clarified (dignity is obtained).

The  more traditional liberal one in which individuals are free to express their individuality and are not hindered by the state.

Next to this interpretation he notes that some groups, define their identity in function of ethnic background, race or religion. This leads to potentially illiberal forms of nationalism and politically organized religion (e.g. Islamism).

A third way to deal with identity is the leftist approach which supports different smaller groups of under-evaluated people, and glorifies diversity as such. FF is definitely not happy with this leftist approach : First, diversity is itself no “Creed” and FF is convinced of the need to have a Creed, a joint moral platform as a basis for the nation; Second, because the Left rejects the Creed of the superiority of the foundations of the System of Liberal Democracy ; Third, because they no longer support their initial public, the workers.

Therefore, according to FF there is a need to propagate the essence of the Creedal message to all involved. This must be the glue that holds the unavoidable diversity  together. I believe that this Creedal element is similar if not equal to Bassam Tibi’s  concept of “Leitkultur”. In both cases the Creed/Leitkultur will propagate the essence of Liberal Democracy and ideals like Freedom and Equality. And while the right-wing refuses newcomers and the leftists claim open borders, FF stresses the need to make a difference between citizen, documented immigrant and undocumented immigrant and states that the real focus of all, both left and right should be “on strategies for better assimilating immigrants to a country’s Creedal identity.” (p. 171)

FF makes separate recommendations for the European Union and for the United States. Hereafter we follow this logic :

The European Unit should:

> create a “single citizenship whose requirements would be based on adherence to basic liberal democratic principles” ;

> invest in a European Identity “through the creation of the appropriate symbols and narratives”;

> better controls its borders by a better staffing of Frontex, the border control unit.

Individual member states :

> who base citizenship on ius sanguinis should introduce a citizenship based on ius solis;

> should reject dual citizenship;

> should deconstruct their systems of pillarization (as exists in Holland and Belgium);

The United States on the other hand :

> has already a Creedal identity but this identity is under attack by both the Left and the Right;

> has a system to teach “basic civics” but this is in long term decline;

> has installed different educational programs which aim to speed up the acquisition of English but have led by now to the creation of “constituencies of their own” with their own bureaucracies;

> should hold on to the meaningful distinctions between citizens and non-citizens and between documented and not-documented non-citizens;

> should consider the introduction of a national service as a requirement to obtain the nationality;

> should continue its enforcement policies, but a Wall is not needed to ensure enforcement. What is required is a national identification system that would allow employers to verify the citizen-status of the employees;

> should set-up a path to citizenship for undocumted persons;

> should devote more attention to social policies.

17 september 2019

In “The Red-haired Woman” (p.219) it comes to a confrontation between a father and his son with the following dialogue as a result. I dare to assume that for Pamuk this dialogue does not only reflect on father-son  relations but also, if not mostly, on the relation between the believer and his God.

“What is a father to you?”

“A father is a doting, charismatic figure who will until his dying day accept and watch over the child he sires. He is the origin and the center of the universe. When you believe that you have a father, you are at peace even when you can’t see him, because you know that he is always there, ready to love and protect you. I never had a father like that. “

” Neither did I, ” I said  impassively. “But if I’d had one, he’d have expected me to obey him, and he’d have suppressed my individuality with his affection and the force of his personality!”

17 september 2019

Here some clarifications why I am an atheist. These clarifications may be useful in further discussions on religion.

I was raised in the Catholic culture and initially the Catholic belief had even an important emotional value for me. However, over time, I could not make it connect with my strong rational mindset.

I realised that an assumption that God had created the world did not clarify anything at all. Even assuming that a creature would have created the world, the questions would become (1) what kind of animal that was, where it came from, what it’s chemical substance was, if it could think… (2) what it’s motivation was to create the world… (3) if it still alive , and so many other questions.

In the area between ontology and ethics it was off course always difficult to accept that an all powerful God allowed so much suffering in the world.

In the purely ethical area I had two additional problems. In 1981 Ronald Reagan became the new president of the United States and soon observers noted that he had, what was called, a teflon-image, meaning that if something positive had happened, all the honours were for him while, if something went wrong, some assistant was to blame. At that moment I noted the similarity with the guilt-concept in Catholicism and Christianity. If something went wrong I was to take the blame while if something went well, I had to praise the Lord. This seemed completely unfair, especially if the all powerful had created myself.

A second ethical problem which bothered me was that the concept of God seemed to imply that we humans had to obey blindly. At school we learned not to accept a “befehl ist befehl” logic but when it came to relgion, suddenly the rules changed. The story of Abraham willing to sacrifice his son Isaac was in that context deeply disturbing. Should an ethically aware not revolt to that creature who called himself God ?

It was also difficult to understand why 2000 years ago a man died on a cross for my sins while I was not yet born.

Further, I could early on in life not believe in a concept of eternal life after death or a resurrection at a certain moment at the end of times.

17 september 2019

Sometimes the question is raised whether there exists a need for a European Islam. Hereafter I defend that at its core there is no need for such a thing and that it certainly is not up to atheists like myself to create something like a European Islam. I do believe that in the margins there might be room for a European “format”. I will explain that at another time in another text.

Of course we should not be naïve and be aware that if European governments apply the principle of separation between state and religion, the outcome may be that in practice Moroccan, Turkish, Saudi or Qatari governments organize Islam in our cities or preach their versions of Islam in our land. We should ensure that this does not happen.

What we can however offer to the Islam in Europe is a critical dialogue with Islam. Such a critical dialogue is not possible in its homelands, be it Saudi-Arabia or Iran. We can question the key values and their underpinning, their sources and the basic reasonings. We can question whether practices are really religious or rather cultural. However, again we should not be naïve.

In November 2014 the eminent Flemish professors Rik Torfs and Etienne Vermeersch gave an interview in the Flemish newspaper De Standaard. Earlier, Etienne Vermeersch, renowned atheist, had in another discussion with a hijab wearing muslima on television, stated in a very affirmative way that the Quran did not impose the wearing of the hijab. In the interview in de Standaard of November 2014, Rik Torfs, professor at (and at that moment also Rector of) the KUL questioned why the atheist professor tried to convince the Muslima of his point of view. According to the catholic professor, there was no reason why the atheist professor would intervene in what the catholic professor called an internal religious debate. According to me, Vermeersch answered correctly that his only intention was to correct a wrong statement by the muslima. Whether Vermeersch was correct with his statement on the hijab is in this context irrelevant. What we see at work is how an overall “rationalist” catholic professor tries to stonewall religious discussions against an atheist discours.

In his book “Snow”, the Turkish Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk describes a discussion with a muslima who states that “when God makes a clear and definite command, it’s not a matter for ordinary mortals to question”. However , she adds : “but do not assume from this that our religion leaves no room for discussion.” But she concludes : “I will say that I’m not prepared to discuss my faith with an atheist – or even a secularist. I beg your pardon.” (page 114)

These two examples demonstrate a refusal by religious people to discuss the religious phenomenon with outsiders. Religious people might prefer to flee (hide) in their “mental parallel-communities”, but that is something the Free, Critical West should not allow.

17 september 2019

Page 41 :

“The most striking aspect of the Burma debate today is its absence of nuance and its singularly ahistorical nature. Dictatorship and the prospects for democracy are seen within the prism of the past ten or twenty years, as if three Anglo-Burmese wars, a century of colonial rule, an immensely destructive Japanese invasion and occupation, and five decades of civil war, foreign intervention, and Communist insurgency had never happened. A country the size and population of the German Empire on the eve of the First World War is viewed through a single-dimensional lens, and then there is surprise over predictions unfulfilled and strategies that never seem to bear fruit. Burma is a place with a rich and complex history, both before the time of King Thibaw and Lord Randolph Churchill and since. Burmese nationalism and xenophobia, the ethnic insurgencies and the army dictatorship, and the failure of successive governments to keep pace with the rest of an increasingly peaceful and prosperous Asia – all these things have a history, a reason. And what emerges from these histories is not an answer to all of today’s ills but at least the beginnings of an explanation. And from this explanation perhaps a richer discussion and a better intimation of what may lie ahead.”

What Myint-U explains is that it does not make sense to assess the quality of welfare or democracy in states (In this case Burma) without taking into account its precedents. Liberal Democracy cannot be imposed in one day, welfare cannot be created overnight, based on simple voluntaristic decisions. Structures which were built over decades, if not centuries (?), determine the (im)possibility of the creation of a successful society, based on democracy and generating wealth for all its citizens. With an expensive word : the success of the implementation is path-dependant.

However, in his quote Myint-U probably does not focus on the main weakness of Burma; It contains an important set of minorities with for us in the West mostly unknown names : the Shan, the Karen, the Kachin, the Mon, the Chin, the Arakans, the Rohingya and many others. Burma’s existential question is probably whether it can survive without some level of dictatorial centralizing force.

17 september 2019

In the history of Europe as I described it in my book LIBERAL QUICKSAND I assign an important place to the principle of National Self Determination (PNSD). It was invoked throughout recent history to justify the creation of new nations/states.

To a certain degree the principle is used ( but only sparsely) in theories of political philosophy.

And in International Law we only find an explicit confirmation of this right when the status of colonies is discussed (Declaration on the Granting of Independance to Colonial Countries and Peoples – Resolution 1514 xv – 1960).

Therefore, what seems central in history, in the past does not seem to have a place in the world of today ?

17 september 2019

A first impression after reading this book was one of confusion and disbelief. The approach seemed so very distant from reality by focusing on the concept of Global Egalitarian Justice based on a global English speaking Demos that I was afraid that philosophy, by definition, was and had to be irrelevant for the world of today. Especially the clear intention of setting back nations to an instrumental level was unsettling although it should not have come as a surprise ; it only confirmed that liberals struggle to give a place to nation-building (what I already knew).

Fortunately I was subsequently also able to read critiques on this book in another book with the title “Linguistic Justice” which gave me the clear impression that I was not the only one who struggled with the somewhat unwordly approach. Especially the comments by Rainer Baubock came much closer to my own mindset in which national self-determination is essential and whereby this is based on an element which according to me should be central to a Theory of Linguistic Justice, namely that an individual should have the right to be governed, administered, taxed, educated and judged in his or her own language.

Now some more detailed critique :

1) Nations should be instrumentalized to realize Linguistic Justice, according to PvP. Let’s assume we agree with this (quod non). Then there is hopefully an agreement that we need nations/states as instruments given that the world is too big to be governed in one state. How will we draw borders ? I hope that we will quickly agree that the best way to organize these administrations will be according to a principle of linguistic territoriality based on the fact that people should be governed in their own language. And then we will be close to the situation as this currently is in Europe, with the same places of contention as is currently the case ? Outside Europe the question is if we provide justice by organizing education in English or in the local/native language. I tend to believe it should be in local/ native language.

2) imposing English as the language of government, also at the European level, and not providing any translations in the local languages is a very bad idea for two importanr reasons :

– it creates two classes in Europe ; the ones who speak English and govern, next to the ones who do not govern and should apparently  not know the rules ;

– linked to the previous : it further distances the citizens from Europe, which is exactly what we currently do not need.

17 september 2019

On the pages 136-137 of his book F. Fukuyama describes an essential weakness of political liberalism as a philosophy :

“The political theorist Pierre Manent notes that most democracies were built on top of preexisting nations, societies that already had a well-developed sense of national identity that defined the sovereign people. But those nations were not created democratically: Germany, France, Britain, and the Netherlands were all the historical by-products of long and often violent political struggles over territory  and culture under nondemocratic regimes.  When these societies democratized, their territorial extent and their existing populations were simply taken for granted as the basis for popular sovereignty…

Manent identifies a major gap in modern democratic theory.  Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, the authors of the Federalist Papers, and John Stuart Mill all assumed that the world was predivided into nations that formed the foundation of democratic choice. They did not provide a theory of why the border between the United States and Mexico should run along the Rio Grande, whether Alsace should belong to France or Germany, whether Quebec should be part of Canada or a “distinct society,” on what grounds Catalonia could legitimately separate itself from Spain, or what the proper level of immigration should be.

Such theorizing has been left to others.”

17 september 2019

In Chaper 1 PvP takes note in a factual way that English has become the lingua franca of Europe and probably of the whole world. From a normative perspective he wellcomes the existence of a universal lingua franca and this especially because of his interest to achieve Egalitarian Global Justice. PvP is very outspoken on this subject : ” any honest attempt to think seriously about justice for our century must downgrade nations and states from the ethical framework to the institutional toolkit.” (p.26) It is not so important for PvP that English is the universal lingua franca ; the important point is that there is a lingua franca (in the making).

There are two key reasons why PvP needs a universal Lingua franca to realise Egalitarian Global Justice. First, we need such language to raise awareness about our basic egalitarian status, to enable a process of “ethical contagion”. Second, such language is needed to construct a demos, a political group that is ready to implement at a world-wide level a state of global egalitarian justice.

In the next four chapters PvP will discuss if the existence of a universal lingua franca does in itself not create great injustices of its own.

In chapter 2 PvP focuses on what he considers to be merely “wrinkles on the surface”. It relates to injustice as a consequence of a free-rider phenomenon ; native English speakers profit from the fact that non-native English make the effort to learn English and they do not pay a compensation (tax) for this. In a context of linguistic justice such situation can not be understood as a “fair cooperation”. However, this free-rider phenomenon is offset by a free-rider phenomenon in the other direction ; non-native English speakers profit from their access to information made available by the community of native English speakers. Both phenomena cancel each other out and justice is served.

In chapter 3 PvP focuses on linguistic justice as “equal opportunity”, a principle which also seems disrespected in a world in which the lingua franca is in the making. People who have the lingua franca as native language are favoured because they have better access to jobs which require knowledge of the lingua franca, they fulfil the linguistic requirements for other jobs, they are betteŕ in face-to-face interaction in the lingua franca and they have access to the broad media in the lingua franca. “This privilege is understandably perceived as a senior distributive injustice by those who do not enjoy it…”. Subsequently PvP discusses how this inequality should be treated.  The best solution is according to him to speed up the distribution of the knowledge of the lingua franca. He notices that in some countries, mostly with a relative strong language, the spread of the lingua franca is slowed down by the use of dubbing and therefore PvP is in favour of a prohibition of dubbing.

In chapter 4 PvP turns to the fact that the rise of the lingua franca can be met by a feeling of injustice in the form of lack of “parity of esteem”. People will feel it as an injustice that their native language is not treated in the same way as the lingua franca. According to PvP “This is a dimension of justice commonly ignored in theories of distributive justice, including my own, as developed in Real Freedom for All.” However PvP does not seem to bother too much about this form of injustice. Again it will melt away with the distribution of the lingua franca. The more people are familiar with English, the less they will insist on an equal treatment of their own native language.

But in chapter 5 PvP takes note that in practice, in Europe, parity of esteem is realised to a great extent by a system of linguistic territoriality. Weaker languages are protected by borders and coercive regimes against socio-linguistic processes. Further, PvP starts developing a justification of this “territoriality”-principle within his framework of Global Egalitarian Justice. And remarkably he does not want to use national sovereignty as an axiom in this search :

“Appeal to national sovereignty, however, would be inappropriate in the present context. Nations, politically organized people’s, are not part of the ethical framework of Global Egalitarian Justice. They are sheer instruments to be created and dismantled, structured and absorbed, empowered and constrained, in the service of justice understood as far more than the sheer protection of fundamental liberties. Consequently, whether a territorial linguistic regime is legitimate is not a question that can be settled by appealing to national sovereignty, but rather one that needs to be settled in order to determine how extensive national sovereignty is allowed to be.”

In the fifth and last chapter of his book PvP discusses the (lack of) importance of linguistic diversity.

Overall PvP develops in this book a theory of linguistic justice embedded in a target to realise “Global Egalitarian Justice”. In that context he welcomes the development of a lingua franca, English, and investigates whether this development creates injustices. He treats the potential cooperative injustice, distributive injustice (lack of equal opportunity) and lack of parity of esteem and underpins the use of territorial integrity to preserve the weaker languages and therefore the parity of esteem (without using the principle of national sovereignty).

17 september 2019

Part 1 of a Trilogy.

Although I’m in principle not a fan of fiction, I gladly make an exception for this book. (until now I’ve only read part 1 of the three volumes – I’m sure the other two will follow quickly.)

Here, I will not dive into the overall rich content of the book, with e.g. the psychological insights displayed by the key-person, the young Balthazar. I limit myself to the fact that the novel is an interesting investigation of the creation of an Estonian awareness. This awareness is centered around the specific Estonian language and the absence of a specific Estonian nobility in the 16th century. The Estonian peasants are under attack from different plagues (Muscovites, Swedes, Germans and some others) and have to re-think to which plague they will swear allegiance. When will the idea surge that they could remain loyal to themselves ?

Quote uit :

Middagjournaal – Bart Peeters – Radio 1 – 13/09/2019

… Maar die mannen bedienen zich van een totaal achterhaald wapen, “inhoud”, de laatste strohalm voor lelijke losers…

13 september 2019

Nationalism is an emotionally loaded term. It should not be like that.

Nationalism refers in the first place to the process which started with the French Revolution whereby a nation creates a state or a state a nation with a linguistically homogeneous territory. An ideology that drives the process can an be called nationalistic. The end result of the process is a nation-state. As a consequence of the nationalistic process multinational states were transformed into linguistically homogeneous nation states. As said, the process started with the French Revolution and accelerated around 1848, after World Wars I and II and after the falling apart of the Sovjet-Union in 1989.

The process can take two different forms. Or the State takes the initiative to form the nation (France, Hungary) or a people, a nation takes the initiative to take hold of a territory of its own and impose its own language in that territory. The first process functions top-down while the second one is a bottom-up process. Both are “democratic” in the sense that in both cases the whole nation should learn the same language. Before the French Revolution only the elites had to be familiar with the language of the state. After the French Revolution everybody should learn that language. The new French Republic wanted to be sure that all citizens understood what the revolution was all about and did not hesitate to impose the French language and eliminate languages like Provencal, Breton and Flemish. In that sense the bottom-up approach is more democratic than the top-down approach because in the bottom-up approach a people or nation invoked the right to self-determination to create its own state with its own territory. That in such process the previous rulers were deported, executed or assimilated is then considered acceptable collateral damage.

To summarize : nationalism is a historical process that was realized in Europe in the last twohundred years and led to the creation of linguistically homogeneous nation-states. To the degree that the process can be supported by and boils down to the execution of the right to self-determination, nationalism should be evaluated morally in a positive way.

Nationalism, in the meaning explained above, does not contain a feeling of superiority versus other nations. Nationalism can of course be mingled with phenomena like imperialism and racism, but there is no intrinsic link between these phenomena. Imperialism and racism can as well be linked to ideologies like socialism and capitalism. Socialistists who tend to impose their ideology by force are imperialists ; in case a surge against a rich class is framed in terms of a surge against a certain race or nation, it becomes racist. Capitalists can deem some races so inferior that slavery and imperialism become acceptable.

9 september – update 7 oktober 2019

Centraal in het NVA-discours staat het vaste voornemen om de Belgische staatsstructuur om te vormen in confederale zin. De enen lachen “confederalisme” weg als een onduidelijk begrip. Anderen zien dit als een ietwat moeilijker term voor wat in realiteit onversneden separatisme is. Nog anderen stellen dat de huidige Belgische staatsstructuur reeds confederale karakteristieken bevat. Anderen ontkennen dit.

In een poging om niet verward te raken in semantische discussies en op pragmatische wijze vooruitgang te boeken in discussies rond dit thema, maken we hierbij twee opmerkingen.

1°) Volgens de huidige grondwet heeft een regering een meerderheid nodig in het parlement op het nationaal niveau. Er is geen meerderheid vereist op het niveau van elk gewest of elke gemeenschap. Tegelijk lijkt iedereen het er wel over eens dat een regering die geen meerderheid heeft in het Franstalig of het Nederlandstalig landsgedeelte een democratisch deficit vertoont en derhalve een beperkte legitimiteit heeft. Een staatsstructuur waar een meerderheid per gemeenschap vereist zou zijn, is confederaler dan een staatsstructuur waar enkel een meerderheid op het nationaal niveau vereist is. Intuitief lijken de geesten akkoord dat een ontwikkeling in die (“confederale”) richting gezond en legitiem zou zijn.

2°) Wat lang geleden reeds werd voorspeld, heeft zich op 26 mei 2019 in realiteit omgezet. De Franstalige en de Vlaamse gemeenschappen hebben zeer uiteenlopend gestemd wat tot gevolg heeft dat de respectievelijke wenslijstjes sterk uiteen lopen.  Op dit ogenblik lijkt de “splitsing van de sociale zekerheid”  niet bespreekbaar voor de Franstaligen. Maar als het wenslijstje van de Franstalige gemeenschap socialere maatregelen wil nemen (met een extra kost) terwijl Vlaanderen ietwat minder sociale maatregelen wil nemen met grotere aandacht voor de financieringskost, dan kan dit leiden tot absurde situaties op het niveau van de sociale zekerheid. Wat de Vlamingen met hun beleid zouden besparen, wordt dan eventueel uitgegeven door de Franstaligen. Het systeem bevat dan geen mechanismen om de gemeenschappen financieel te responsabiliseren voor hun beleid. Iedereen zal waarschijnlijk akkoord gaan dat dit een onrechtvaardig scenario is. Als confederalisme niet bespreekbaar is, dan is financiële responsabilisering van de Gewesten voor hun beleid dat waarschijnlijk wel.

3°) In Terzake van 7 oktober 2019 legde ex informateur Johan Vande Lanotte uit dat het mogelijk moest zijn om na te denken over hoe het beleid dichter kon aansluiten bij de realiteit op het terrein. Hij verwees daarbij naar twee terreinen waar de verschillen tussen de regio’s of subregio’s van die aard zijn dat een verschillende aanpak te verdedigen valt, namelijk de werkgelegenheid en de gezondheidszorg. De professor beklemtoonde dat hiervoor geen staatshervorming vereist is en dat dit niets met confederalisme of regionalisering te maken heeft.[Update 7 oktober 2019]